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Charcoal Power: 
The Political Violence of Non-Fossil Fuel in Uganda 
 
Abstract: 
The politics of global energy are subject to increasing academic interest. Most work 
on energy politics focuses on oil, based upon a normative vision of a global energy 
modernity of fossil fuels and a transition to renewables. In most African countries, 
however, the primary source of energy is not oil, but woodfuel. Charcoal is of 
particular importance due to its centrality to urbanization: charcoal is the primary 
energy source for up to 80% of urban Africa, and its consumption is expected to 
continue increasing with expanding urbanization. Despite this centrality, the politics 
of charcoal remain largely unexplored. This article explores how political power 
shapes charcoal production and how charcoal as an energy source shapes political 
power through an in-depth study of charcoal extraction in northern Uganda. It argues 
that charcoal production, and its particular destructiveness, should be understood as a 
continuation of the violence of the 1986-2006 war between the Lord’s Resistance 
Army and the Ugandan government. Based on several months of fieldwork in 
Northern Uganda, the article draws a distinction between the politics of small-scale 
household production and of large-scale industrial production. By focusing on the 
political violence of industrial charcoal production, we argue that orthodox academic 
and policy narratives about the charcoal industry in Africa can be qualified, and new 
questions can be raised concerning broader narratives of energy modernity and global 
energy politics. 
 






Introduction: The Power of Non-Fossil Fuels in Africa 
In Carbon Democracy, Timothy Mitchell argues that, to understand the relation 
between oil and politics, we need to focus upon the materiality of oil and avoid the 
abstractions of the dominant “resource curse” literature. That literature removes oil 
from its social and political context, from the earth it is buried in, the workers and 
infrastructures that extract and move it, the military forces that protect it, and the acts 
of resistance that sabotage it, occluding the ways that oil’s global circulation powers 
politics. Instead, we need to “follow the production and circulation of oil itself” in 
order to comprehend democracy “as a form of politics whose mechanisms…involve 
the processes of producing and using carbon energy” (Mitchell, 2011: 5).  
 
We follow Mitchell’s method, while questioning the implication that the modern 
world is one everywhere based on oil, and that, to understand the politics of global 
energy modernity, oil must be at the center of analysis (Urry, 2014). Indeed, in much 
of Africa, oil may not be the form of carbon energy whose processes of production 
and consumption most shape and power politics. Of course, it is crucial in states with 
large oil industries, and oil has a key role throughout Africa in sustaining transport 
systems, enabling middle-class and elite lifestyles, and integrating national and global 
economies (Bassey, 2012; Soares De Olivera, 2015; Watts, 2009). 
 
In many African countries, however, it may be non-fossilized carbon, in the form of 
firewood or charcoal, that is the energy source most bound up with politics, even if in 
less spectacular fashions. The numbers would seem to support this proposition: 
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woodfuels meet 90 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s household energy needs and 
about 80% of “total final energy consumption” (IEA, 2014: 131; excluding South 
Africa). Charcoal is the primary energy source for about 80 percent of urban 
households, while firewood is the primary source for about the same percentage of 
rural households. Of global charcoal production, 61% occurs in Africa (Doggart and 
Meshack, 2017; citing FAO, 2016), and Africa’s rapidly growing urban populations 
mean that charcoal consumption is expected to rise another 50% between 2010 and 
2030 (Broadhead et al., 2001; in Arnold, 2006: 599; see also the projections in IEA, 
2014).1 
 
In Uganda, the focus of this article, charcoal is the primary energy source for about 
70% of urban households, rising to 90% in Kampala (Mukwaya, 2016; MEMD, 2016; 
UNDP 2013). Two million metric tons of charcoal are produced each year (MEMD, 
2016), and, with Uganda’s urban population expected to double between 2010 and 
2040, charcoal demand is estimated to be increasing annually at 3% to 6% (MEMD, 
2016; UNDP, 2013). Hundreds of thousands of people in Uganda depend on charcoal 
as a source of income (Mwampamba et al., 2013), and it has even been said to be the 
highest-earning cash crop for rural Ugandan households (WWF 2015). 
 
Despite the centrality and growing significance of charcoal to lives and livelihoods in 
urban and rural Africa, the burgeoning literature on the politics of energy makes little 
mention of it (Vanderheiden 2011; Boyer 2014; Huber 2015). When charcoal does 
appear, it tends to be relegated to the status of a “traditional,” non-modern fuel, a 
symptom of energy poverty and energy injustice (Sovacool and Dworkin, 2014; 
Jones, 2016). However, there is nothing “traditional” about charcoal as a fuel; its 
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widespread use is bound up with postcolonial urbanization, it is integrated into global 
and regional trade networks, and, in some places, it is a key fuel for industry. There 
are still no comprehensive investigations into charcoal power in Africa: a few works 
explore how political power shapes charcoal (Ribot 1998; Cavanagh et al. 2015; 
Bergmann et al. 2018), but the question of how charcoal shapes political power and 
the longer political-economic-ecological histories in which it is produced and 
consumed remain woefully under-researched. Despite its centrality to social life in 
much of Africa, it has largely gone under the political radar, in part due to the 
assumptions surrounding it, as detailed below. By looking at charcoal as a question of 
energy and political form, we can start to delineate the entwined power relations, both 
political and energetic, that are bound up in charcoal’s production, transport, and 
consumption, locally, nationally, and internationally. We can ask about the state 
forms that charcoal enables, the social structures that charcoal produces, and the 
possibilities and limitations of those politics. It allows us to better grasp African 
countries’ position within international energy economies and global political 
ecologies. 
 
Approaching charcoal in this way also allows it to be located within history. Charcoal 
is part of longer histories of energy, resource extraction, rural-urban relations, state 
control over forests and peoples, and, in cases like northern Uganda, war and political 
violence. In charting out an approach to charcoal power, this article focuses on the 
production and transport of charcoal within Uganda’s northern region over the last ten 
years, that is, since the end of Uganda’s two-decade war between the Lord’s 
Resistance Army and Ugandan government in 2007. While it does not address long-
term histories of energy or environmental politics, it does draw on a more recent 
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history for its central argument: that today’s charcoal politics can be understood only 
by placing charcoal extraction within the history of the war’s physical and social 
devastation.2 To understand charcoal’s particular destructiveness, its production and 
trade must be seen as made possible by, and exacerbating, legacies of the war. In 
certain aspects, charcoal extraction can even be seen as a continuation of the war 
through different means and under different conditions of state violence against 
civilians.  
 
Ignoring this history and context leads to untenable technical “solutions” being put 
forward to the problems associated with charcoal in Uganda, centered around better 
regulation, increased monitoring, and technological innovations such as fast-growing 
tree species and improved kilns and stoves. In a way, this too reprises another aspect 
of the concluded war: technical international interventions, whether humanitarian, 
peacebuilding, or legal, that ignore politics and end up being ineffective or 
counterproductive (Branch 2011). Thus, the history of violence in northern Uganda 
needs to be taken into account if today’s environmental interventions are not to fall 
into the same patterns of the past. Before coming to that history, we turn first to 
charcoal’s treatment in two bodies of academic and policy literature: the energy 
transitions literature and the rural development literature. We argue that both tend to 
ignore the power of charcoal because both abstract charcoal from the political 
histories it is embedded in. 
 
Data for this paper have been gathered through a set of qualitative research 
methodologies including fieldwork, participant observation, community dialogues, 
focus groups and semi-structured interviews conducted in five charcoal-producing 
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districts of Acholi sub-region of northern Uganda during several months in 2017. 
Specifically, community members were interviewed collectively through dialogues 
and within cross-cutting sub-groups, such as women, elders, and youth. Questions 
focused on the history, character and scope of charcoal production, the extent of tree 
cutting and the groups involved, the benefits, in particular monetary income, and 
problems, including deforestation, loss of biodiversity and climate change associated 
with charcoal burning. Interviews also looked to place charcoal in the context of 
broader agrarian transformations and the legacies of war. In-depth, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with key informants selected among local government 
officials, politicians, intermediaries, brokers, and labor crews, and concerned issues of 
policies and trade regulation, prices and licenses, and labour and modes of production. 
This approach allowed seeing charcoal production from multiple perspectives 
providing us with several entry points into the research questions.3  
 
 
Charcoal between Tradition and Modernity  
When charcoal does make an appearance in the literature on the global politics of 
energy, it is largely only to be dismissed. The energy transitions framework often 
underlying this literature tends to have a teleological analytical and normative bias 
towards fossil and post-fossil fuels, and so charcoal is presented as an atavistic, 
traditional, pre-modern form of energy, akin to firewood, dung, and agricultural 
residues, giving way to an inevitable global fossil fuel or post-fossil fuel modernity. 
This framework underlies high-modernist development visions propagated by many 
African states, which assume that charcoal will be left behind in state-led transitions 
to fossil fuels, hydropower, and nuclear energy (Doggart and Meshack, 2017; 
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Mwampamba et al., 2013). For instance, Uganda’s National Development Plan of 
2010 calls for full energy modernization in 30 years, while Uganda Vision 2040 
(NPA, 2013) declares that, “For Uganda to shift from a peasantry to an industrialized 
and largely urban society, it must be propelled by electricity as a form of modern 
energy,” (73) and projects nuclear becoming Uganda’s primary energy source. The 
widely contested notion of an “energy ladder” can underlie this vision: a Ugandan 
think-tank invokes the need to “transition from firewood and charcoal through 
kerosene to LPG and electricity;” thus, “when households climb the energy ladder, 
forest resources utilization reduces as less of firewood and charcoal are required” 
(Mwaura et al., 2014: 4). In such teleological thinking, charcoal is abstracted from its 
material, historical context and understood simply as a step in a supposed energy 
ladder (Hiemstra-van der Horst and Hovorka 2008). The result, as Zulu and 
Richardson write, is that “too much faith in the ‘energy transition’ theory has 
undermined realistic, proactive policy-making on charcoal” (2013: 128). 
 
However, research has made clear that dismissing charcoal as being on its way out is 
unwarranted. Mwampamba et al. (2013) argue that there is in fact no evidence for a 
general “energy transition” through charcoal to electricity or fossil fuels. In fact, the 
proportion of African urban households using charcoal as their primary fuel is itself 
increasing (ibid.; Zulu and Richardson, 2013). The numbers can be dramatic: in 
Tanzania, for instance, a 1% increase in urban population leads to a 14% increase in 
wood consumption (Mwampamba et al., 2013). Even industrialization may lead to 
greater demand for charcoal and other wood fuels, not less. In Uganda’s case, the 
possibility of large-scale fuel switching envisioned by energy modernization appears 
minimal (MEMD, 2013: 77-8; Mann et al., 2014). This reality requires qualifying the 
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normative model of a fossil-fuel “energy modernity” as Africans climb the energy 
ladder (Barnes et al., 2004). The sustained co-existence and competition of biomass 
fuels, fossil fuels, and non-carbon renewable energy may not be a sign of an ongoing 
transition (Sovacool 2012). Rather, charcoal’s importance to urbanization, to global 
trade networks, to rural incomes, and to industry means that this mix, if anything, is 
energy modernity in much of Africa. 
 
The tendency to dismiss charcoal in the energy transitions literature also derives from 
the view of it as inherently and uniformly ecologically destructive and, thus, 
unsustainable. This negative portrayal resonates with fears in the 1970s of a coming 
“woodfuel crisis” in the face of expanding populations and dwindling forest stock 
(Arnold et al., 2006). Charcoal’s supposed unsustainability has taken a global 
dimension with concern over its contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions 
(Chidumayo et al., 2013) as well as interest in the possibility of “green charcoal” 
creating carbon emissions credits (Bailiss et al., 2015).  
 
Today, the degree to which charcoal extraction is contributing to deforestation and 
forest degradation is a subject of intense debate (Bergmann et al., 2018). Catastrophe 
narratives continue to abound, but the categorical identification of charcoal with 
deforestation and ecological unsustainability has been robustly challenged as a 
“myth” (Mwampamba et al., 2013; Chidumayo et al, 2013), much as the “woodfuel 
crisis” narrative was previously (Chidumayo 1987, 1993; Leach and Mearns, 1988; 
Fairhead and Leach, 1998). Much research on charcoal agrees that there is little 
conclusive evidence that its production is a major driver of deforestation on a global 
or even regional level when compared to other causes, in particular the expansion of 
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large-scale commercial farming, ranching, and commercial timber, the beneficiaries 
of which are happy to use charcoal production as a scapegoat. However, Chidumayo 
et al (2013) point out that even if deforestation from charcoal is relatively minor at a 
global or regional scale, it can be dramatic at a local or national scale. Bailis et al 
(2015) have identified woodfuel “hotspots” where current extraction is deemed 
unsustainable, with the largest “incorporating a swath of East African extending from 
Eritrea through western Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.”  
 
What this points to is that the ecological impact of charcoal should be categorically 
deemed neither catastrophic nor negligible. Indeed, charcoal can be produced in many 
different ways with many different ecological impacts. What the impact of charcoal 
production is – and thus whether it is sustainable or not – is partly a technical question 
involving cutting practices, kilns, and stoves. But, as the case of northern Uganda 
demonstrates, it is also a political question: in situations where charcoal production 
and trade are controlled by those who do not have to deal with the ecological 
destruction they wreak, and where there is no accountability to those populations who 
do pay the price, ecologically devastating but highly profitable modes of production 
may be the norm. Maintaining the transitions myth that charcoal is on its way out and 
should be on its way out allows states to disavow responsibility for the industry and 
its damage, at the same time that powerful actors, often with state connections, take 
advantage of the lack of legal regulation and public accountability to reap enormous 
profits at the cost of rural communities. New thinking about national development 
would thus have to start with a recognition of the many possibilities of charcoal 
within a broader energy mix (WWF 2015), while also grappling with the often very 




Weak Links in Charcoal Value Chains 
The literature that does take charcoal seriously as an important present and future 
energy source is the rural development literature, with an emphasis on forest products, 
livelihoods, and land-use change, which has helped foster a positive reassessment of 
charcoal in some development thinking (Arnold et al., 2006; Sola et al., 2017). This 
literature largely comprises market-oriented analyses and recommendations for 
regulation of charcoal value chains. It focuses on problems commonly associated with 
the charcoal industry – that it is exploitative towards rural producers, a lost source of 
government revenue, and a potential cause of deforestation and ecological damage – 
and responds with calls for regulation and improvements to the value chain. In the 
words of UNDP (2013: 8), charcoal is “an important opportunity to help shape future 
low carbon development”, since an “improved charcoal value chain” would remove a 
“major driver of deforestation while increasing energy security and sustainability.” 
However, except for a few contributions, this mostly policy-oriented literature, due to 
its underlying assumptions, also largely misses the politics of charcoal. This is 
illustrated by the literature on Uganda. 
 
First, the dominant value-chain literature tends to assume that charcoal production is 
everywhere carried out by many dispersed, very poor, individual or household rural 
charcoal producers, who earn very little. The UNDP (2013: 18) declares that, in 
Uganda, “charcoal production is predominantly undertaken by rural populations in 
unorganized groups or individuals,” with the assumption that “charcoal producers 
constitute the ‘poorest of the poor’” (ibid: 38). Uganda’s Ministry of Energy and 
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Mineral Development agrees, describing the “small scale individual producers who 
dominate the sector” (2015: 5). The producers are often assumed to be using 
household labor and rudimentary tools and techniques and to have few alternative 
livelihood opportunities. 
 
Second, the dominant literature often tends to assume that the charcoal value chain 
represents a series of market transactions. Unorganized producers are described as 
connected by agents to a number of competing transporters, who then connect to a 
distinct set of wholesalers and retailers in urban areas, with little vertical integration 
(Shively et al., 2010). Middle-men or elite merchants are often seen as the problem, 
with “a large spectrum of people looking to take advantage of the relatively high price 
difference between the money paid to the producers and the final price paid by 
consumers” (UNDP, 2013: 22). This dominant picture assumes that involvement in 
charcoal production is so skewed against producers – securing only 5-10% of the total 
proceeds (UNDP, 2013) – that charcoal may be further impoverishing the rural poor 
who are involved in its production or who live in areas from where trees are extracted. 
 
Third, much of the dominant literature on charcoal in Africa tends to assume that 
production and trade exist in a regulative vacuum characterized by “weak, misguided, 
neglected, underdeveloped, disjointed, overly prohibitive, contradictory or non-
existent woodfuel policies and laws, combined with poor enforcement and regulatory 
capacity” (Zulu and Richardson, 2013: 130), and that this regulation deficit is to 
blame for charcoal’s negative consequences. The focus is on a lack of legal 
regulation: in Malawi, for instance, all production is illegal (Smith et al., 2015), and in 
Tanzania, 80% of the trade is outside the legally-regulated market (Sander et al., 
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2013). In many places, including Uganda, charcoal is presented as being in a legal 
grey area. Uganda’s decentralization and the multiplication of under-resourced 
districts, according to reports, has led regulation to vary dramatically but to be 
uniformly ineffective (MEMD, 2016: 89-96; Shively et al., 2010). Nationally, 
regulatory frameworks are scattered across different agencies without cohesion. A 
national survey reported widespread uncertainty among government officials and 
dealers as to requirements for legal production (MEMD, 2016: 24). Uganda’s 
National Forestry Act provides few guidelines for forest on non-state lands, the source 
for almost half the wood for charcoal (MEMD, 2016: 29-30). Government 
interventions thus take a “fire-fighting” approach through ministerial declarations or 
district ordinances comprising sweeping bans, often with little effect (MEMD, 2013: 
91; Wandera, 2016; Owich, 2016). The regulation deficit is said to extend to 
communities living among forests, who supposedly require legal enforcement so that 
the illegal, wanton cutting of trees is stopped (as described by Cavanagh et al, 2015). 
 
In short, according to this dominant picture, a coordinated effort of technical 
regulation and technological innovation is needed to improve the value chain so as to 
benefit livelihoods and lives of rural producers, stop illegal production and transport, 
expand the fiscal basis of the state, and promote local, national, and global sustainable 
development, all while ensuring “energy security” for urban areas. This dominant 
picture has not gone uncontested, however, by a more critical strand in charcoal 
research. First, the idea that charcoal is everywhere produced by small-scale, 
unorganized, mostly male, and deeply impoverished producers has been qualified by a 
recognition of diversity among producers. Researchers report many different reasons 
why people, including women, produce charcoal (Smith et al., 2017), and the different 
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impacts it can have upon rural livelihoods, sometimes representing a major source of 
rural employment and income (Mwampamba et al., 2013; Schure et al., 2015). 
Reasons for producing charcoal are also tied into broader systems and transformations 
of land tenure and labor regimes (Bergmann et al., 2018; Barney 2016). In Uganda, 
for instance, Khundi et al. (2011) show that charcoal producers tend to be better off 
than non-producers, and so charcoal production should not necessarily be identified 
with the “poorest of the poor” (see also Ainembabazi et al., 2013). 
 
The ubiquity of small-scale, household labor has also been questioned. In some cases, 
rural inhabitants are not themselves producers but, rather, provide land or trees to be 
cut and burned by migrant work crews (Minten et al., 2013). In Mozambique, 
Baumert et al. (2016) identify two distinct charcoal value chains, one involving small-
scale, household-based operators and producers, and the other large-scale operators 
with hired labor, access to trucks, and machines for cutting the wood; this will 
resonate with the northern Uganda case. Ribot’s (1998) work on charcoal in Senegal 
describes an industry dominated by urban-based elites who contract and bring in 
foreign work crews to cut down large swaths of trees on villagers’ land and reap 
enormous profit. Even Uganda’s National Charcoal Survey provides evidence that 
cuts against its own assumption of the ubiquity of small household producers with 
little or no horizontal or vertical integration. It explains that almost half of all 
producers work on charcoal full-time and half buy their wood instead of collecting it 
themselves, with almost all practicing clear-cutting (MEMD, 2016: 34), suggesting 
that much of the industry comprises full-time contracted laborers. Merchants also 
reported the existence of cartels that exert a heavy influence on the trade (ibid: 68), 
again suggesting an industry not entirely dominated by small producers and 
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unorganized transporters. Shively et al. (2010) describe significant differences in 
labor arrangements even among neighboring districts, with small-scale and large-
scale production sitting side-by-side. However, as we address below, little has been 
done to analyze the political and social implications of these diverse modes and scales 
of production. The result is that the picture of a multitude of small-scale individual 
producers often tends to be taken for granted, and so the problems that may be due to 
large-scale production end up blamed on the rural poor. 
 
The assumption that a deficit of legal regulation is driving the problems of the 
charcoal industry has also come into question as increased attention has been turned 
to the institutions, both formal and informal, that in practice control production and 
trade in the absence of, or in complex relations with, legal regulation (Cavanagh et al 
2015; Schure et al. 2015). Thus, the presence or absence of legal regulation may be of 
less importance than whether the industry is controlled by powerful formal 
institutions, often part of the state or its security services, or whether it is controlled 
by and accountable to informal, community-based arrangements and institutions 
(Baumert et al., 2016). A lack of functioning legal regulation does not imply disorder 
and the need for more law: the law can be captured by powerful state actors, as 
Ribot’s (1998) work on Senegal’s charcoal business makes clear. The question thus 
becomes how to promote informal, community-based forms of regulation (Doggart 
and Meshack, 2017) in a context where ‘heightened forest law enforcement may 
actually exacerbate already existing conflicts between government entities and local 
communities’ (Cavanagh et al 2015, 76).  
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Attention to the range of formal and informal state and community institutions that 
underpin a legally unregulated industry has brought the question of power into work 
on charcoal. Typically, however, the concept is limited to the power to access and 
shape markets and control resources to extract rents (Minten et al., 2013; Sander et 
al., 2013), a limitation tied to the continued primacy given to small-scale, household 
production despite the frequent recognition of large-scale charcoal production. Along 
with Ribot (1998), Cavanagh et al (2015) are among the few to explicitly raise the 
question of political involvement in the charcoal industry. Cavanagh et al conclude 
that the involvement of powerful state and military actors characterizes the East 
African timber trade more than the charcoal trade, and that those cases where charcoal 
does have major involvement by state or non-state military forces – such as Al-
Shabaab in Somalia – are of a relatively minor scale. This may be the case, but it does 
not detract from the need to identify the presence of state or military force in charcoal 
production where it does occur and to distinguish between its political, economic, and 
ecological consequences versus the consequences of small-scale livelihood 
production. A helpful starting point can be found in Bergmann et al’s (2018) proposal 
to see charcoal as part of a ‘fuelscape’ – or perhaps an ‘energyscape’ – which would 
map the ‘contested meaning of commercialized charcoal production in temporal, 
material and social terms” (2), with attention to “dynamics involv[ing] multiple 
spatial scales (such as the urban, regional and national), sectors (such as forestry and 
energy) and stakeholders (including policy-makers, consumers, brokers, sellers and 
producers’ (6). Thus, whether we are seeking to understand the politics of charcoal 
extraction in northern Uganda’s disappearing forests, in commercial woodlots, or in 
Kismaayo, Somalia, where millions of bags are stacked up, prepared for export to the 
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Gulf and fought over by different military forces, we should explore multiscalar 
histories of charcoal production within larger political and ecological histories.  
 
This would mean starting with the political structures within which forms of charcoal 
extraction, labor, and distribution take place, which sometimes take a market form, 
instead of starting with the assumption that politics is an exogenous institutional 
framework or set of pressures that shape the market-based value chain. These political 
structures have specific histories, in which violence can play a role; thus, aspects of 
the industry such as informality, coercion, or unequal access may not be problems of 
an inefficiently operating market but may be understood as a productive part of social 
and political structures – part of a “resource complex” – not deviations from a market 
norm (Watts and Peluso, 2014). Indeed, a recent literature survey (Sola et al., 2017) 
finds few studies considering charcoal at the national level and a neglect of the history 
and institutions around production. The result is that much of the existing literature, 
by abstracting charcoal from its historical, national, and international contexts, does 
little to address broader questions about charcoal power, which may be needed to 
enable the “radical rethinking” of charcoal policy often called for (Zulu and 
Richardson, 2013: 135; Smith et al., 2017). 
 
In summary, while the dominant picture of the industry – comprising small-scale, 
desperately poor charcoal producers, within a chain of unregulated market 
transactions, leading to significant ecological destruction – is still prevalent, in 
particular in the policy literature, it has been greatly qualified. However, even this 
more empirically robust literature has yet to deal extensively with the political power 
of charcoal, which becomes especially important when considering the very different 
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political, social, and ecological implications of small-scale and large-scale production. 
The case of northern Uganda shows that distinguishing between different modes of 
production is crucial, for migrant work crews and local livelihood producers will have 
very different relations to merchants, communities, the state, and forests. Failure to do 
this allows blame for charcoal-related deforestation to be shifted to a supposed 
“tragedy of the commons” among many destitute local-level producers (see Hardin, 
1968), taking attention away from other causes and the divergent range of modes of 
charcoal production. Analytical and policy work needs grounded and empirically 
informed sociological accounts along class, gender, ethnic and generational lines of 
what is sometimes presented as an undifferentiated Ugandan countryside (Bernstein, 
2010; White et al., 2011). In what follows, we try to raise some of these broader 
questions by focusing on one specific section of Uganda’s charcoal industry. 
 
 
Charcoal in Post-War Northern Uganda 
Charcoal production in northern Uganda is recent, but its growth has been dramatic. 
Today, almost 40% of Uganda’s supply of charcoal to urban areas is reported to come 
from the north, whereas ten years ago it was near zero (MEMD, 2016: 57). Charcoal 
is the subject of intense media and public attention in northern Uganda and at the 
center of emphatic narratives of ecological crisis. Stories abound of forests that have 
disappeared and people being unable to recognize formerly familiar landscapes. The 
available statistics signal how extensive tree extraction has been: in 2014, it was 
reported that Gulu and Amuru districts’ forest cover had been almost halved since 
1990 (Laker, 2014). It has been estimated that 4-5000 bags of charcoal are being 
removed from just one district every week (Owich, 2016; Miteva et al., 2017). 
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Nationally, there is talk of a “looming charcoal crisis” (Sserunjogi 2014), based upon 
the fact that an estimated 44 million tons of tree biomass are used each year for 
energy, which could rise to 135 tons, but that tree resources can sustainably supply 
only 26 million tons (MEMD 2013). Forest cover is said to have shrunk over the last 
100 years from 10 million hectares to 3.6 million hectares. The UNDP estimates that 
80,000 hectares of forest are being cleared annually for charcoal and timber, whereas 
it was only 50,000 in 2004 (UNDP, 2013); estimates range from 0.9% to 3.1% of 
forest being lost annually (Environmental Alert, 2009: 10). The Ministry declares that 
Uganda has had a “wood deficit” since 2000 (2015: 1) and concludes that the entire 
industry is “poorly regulated and…unsustainable” (xvii; Mwaura et al., 2014). This 
crisis narrative, however, along with the available local and national statistics, 
occlude differences among different modes of production, tied into different political 
relations and driven by different actors. It is attention to these differences that is key 
to grasping the ecological, but also political and economic, consequences of charcoal 
production in Uganda. 
 
That charcoal production in northern Uganda has only recently escalated makes sense. 
The Acholi sub-region of northern Uganda was ravaged by civil war from 1986-2006, 
during which over a million people – the entire population of Acholi sub-region – had 
been forcibly displaced by the Ugandan government into internment camps, some for 
over a decade (Finnström, 2008; Dolan, 2009; Branch, 2011). Upon return home from 
2008 onwards, people found their fields and homesteads overgrown by trees. People 
had also been divested of their savings, in particular herds of cattle that were looted in 
the early years of the war, allegedly by the state. Without savings, encountering a 
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landscape marked by years of absence, people took advantage of the vast reserve of 
trees to begin small-scale artisanal charcoal production for cash. The main markets for 
the charcoal were probably the urban centres in northern Uganda itself, along with the 
multitude of smaller semi-urban agglomerations located on the sites of the former 
camps.  
 
But a new market soon opened for this northern charcoal: Kampala. In the same years 
that Ugandans were returning to rural homes after displacement, independence in 
South Sudan created a new trade artery from Kampala north to Juba that passed 
through Acholi sub-region as South Sudan became the top destination for Uganda’s 
exports (Ladu, 2018). The trucks carrying goods north to Juba had been returning 
south to Kampala empty, so filling them with charcoal became a way to make money 
off the return journey, as a sub-county chairperson along the highway explained to us. 
And so production developed to meet the Kampala demand, with people reporting 
that they would typically cut trees on their own land or nearby common hunting or 
forest land, burn and bag the charcoal on site using household labor, and then 
transport the bagged charcoal by foot, bicycle, or motorcycle to trading centers or 
main roads. There, the distinctive large white sacks of charcoal, up to a few dozen, 
would be propped up along the side of roads waiting for dealers or transporters who 
would buy and bring it to urban markets further south (Lawino, 2011). It could take 
weeks to produce one bag, often in a collective effort. It is hard to get solid historical 
prices of charcoal, but at the time of research, a sack was typically sold to dealers for 




This small-scale, household charcoal production continues at present. From our 
fieldwork, it appears that both men and women are involved, often using other 
members of the household or hiring neighbors for specific tasks, such as felling the 
largest trees. The reasons that people gave for burning and selling charcoal are 
familiar: poverty, a need for money for school fees, medical treatment, or household 
items. Some spoke of turning to charcoal production to compensate for falling 
productivity of land. Some women presented charcoal production as a way to obtain 
start-up capital for a small business or to join a village savings circle; young men 
spoke of saving for motorcycles to start an individual transport business. For the most 
destitute and landless, charcoal production was presented as their only opportunity to 
gain the income needed to buy food for survival. It was also presented as a strategy to 
compensate for poor harvests, whether caused by drought or other factors; as one 
community member explained in a location affected by elephant incursions: “We 
started burning charcoal due to poverty. This wasn’t what we Acholi used to do. Most 
times the Acholi burned a little charcoal for cooking, but this was started for business 
because of the problem brought by the elephants. They eat everything of yours, so 
you start to struggle; you can cut some wood and, even if just one or two [bags] that 
you burn and sell, you can pay children in school. There is nothing else here.” 
 
The wood for charcoal was reported to come from farming land to which they had 
customary access, from communal forests, hunting, or grazing lands, or from rocky or 
hilly areas inaccessible for farming. Tools were basic: axes and machetes, with the 
burning done in rudimentary earth-mound kilns. It was reported that they would try to 
use fallen wood rather than living trees, and that, when trees were used, trunks or 
stumps would be left so that it could grow back. While appreciating the ready cash 
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charcoal could bring, it was presented largely as an unfortunate necessity of the post-
war period, but one that was thought to be sustainable given the basic tools and 
cutting practices and the limited forest that could be cut by household labor. 
 
 
The Violence of Industrial Charcoal Production 
Today, however, this livelihood, household charcoal production has been 
overwhelmed, at least according to many rural inhabitants and local leaders, by an 
industrialized, large-scale commercial model of production.4 The opening of densely 
forested land in the former conflict area after 2008 occurred as a perceived decline in 
wood supply was arising in areas further south, in particular Luweero and 
Nakasongola, which had been centers of charcoal production. A spike in prices also 
occurred during that time, which led to efforts to rapidly expand the supply (Shively 
et al., 2010; MEMD, 2013). 
 
Industrial production appears to have grown on top of the existing networks of rural 
producers and small-scale transporters and dealers. As the collection of charcoal 
became regularized, truck drivers and small businesspeople began striking deals with 
community members in Acholiland to ensure a regular supply. But relying on 
household labor of mostly peasant farmers proved unable to meet the high demand. 
And so a major change began to occur as charcoal merchants started bringing in their 
own contracted work teams to cut the trees and burn and bag the charcoal on-site. 
Many communities we spoke to identified the change occurring around five or six 
years ago; in other places it has been more recent. In many cases, from discussions 
with the migrant work crews, it appears that production teams were simply moved 
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north as the charcoal frontier shifted from areas of dwindling supply (Sserunjogi, 
2014). 
 
These merchants and work crews needed access to large areas of forested land, which 
was secured through various routes, as explained below. But the effect was clear: the 
rural community, instead of providing labor and controlling production themselves, 
became a bystander, watching as trees or entire forests were cut down by large work 
crews. The money accruing to rural inhabitants through sale of trees seems to be 
highly variable, especially as trees are sold through rough estimations; some reports 
have said anywhere from 100,000 to 1 million shillings are paid per acre (US$25-
250); in other cases, landowners are paid 5000 shillings per bag of charcoal produced 
from trees on their land (Owich, 2016). 
 
Contracted workers – many of them originally from Busoga, an area facing acute land 
pressures, food scarcity and drought – are brought in from the south of Uganda and 
placed in primitive work camps to clear-cut large swathes of forest. They typically 
use chainsaws, as crews of dozens or even hundreds of migrant workers can clear 
entire kilometers of land of trees. Large trucks are a ubiquitous feature of the 
landscape as they ply remote dirt roads and tracks, ferrying workers and supplies in 
and innumerable sacks of charcoal out. Trading centers are filled with huge piles of 
hundreds or thousands of white sacks of charcoal, and Karuma, the main crossing 
point of the Nile and truck stopover, sometimes has mountains of sacks being 
reloaded before their trip to Kampala.  
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This new industrial production is decried as being far more intensive and destructive 
than household production. Work crews are accused of extracting even the roots of 
trees and leaving behind cratered landscapes of burning pits and the few bushes too 
small to burn. Community members denounced the ecological devastation they saw as 
caused by the mass extraction of trees. The most widespread and acute grievance was 
the perception that tree cutting was leading to decreased rainfall and higher 
temperatures, dramatically affecting crop yields. As a group of women in a village in 
Amuru District explained: “Yes, [tree cutting] is there. They cut almost everything, 
they started way from up there to all the way down. Now there’s nothing, the rain has 
also gone silent and now, for us, we are dying of hunger because the ground has dried 
up. We are going to die of hunger, there is nothing to eat – you see this, they come 
and cut everything.” In a nearby parish, a similar account was provided: tree-cutting 
“is ruining the forest. There isn’t any forest anymore. You know that the forest also 
brings rain and prevents the wind. Now the forest isn’t here to stop the wind and bring 
the rain.” Another respondent explained that, “For me, I answer like this: because of 
charcoal burning, hunger has come in. Charcoal has thrown hunger our way.” Such 
accounts point to the destructive character of industrial charcoal production, which is 
transforming localities in northern Uganda into enclaves where the maximum quantity 
of high-demand resources can be extracted at lowest cost within shortest period of 
time. This accords with the logic described by Raj Patel and Jason Moore (2017), in 
which the capitalist frontier expands to control and transform nature, thus maximizing 
flows of commodities from specific areas before shifting elsewhere once the boom of 
resource extraction has been exhausted. Again, however, this is not an inherent logic 
to charcoal production, as it has the possibility of being a renewable resource under 
different modes of production. Charcoal’s current ecological destructiveness has 
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political causes, as we outline below, and so the question is why charcoal production 
and trade has taken this specific form, a form that reprises the broader geography of 
energy injustice and development in Uganda, privileging the south at the expense of 
the north.5 
 
Beyond changing rainfall, there were further reported damaging impacts of industrial 
charcoal production upon livelihoods. In particular, the commons that all depended 
upon for firewood, medicinal plants, grazing lands, and building materials were being 
destroyed. One local leader remarked that no one could find poles or grass for huts, 
and many communities reported a loss of access to firewood. People described how 
the loss of trees was also destroying the foundation for communal solidarity as the 
physical reference points for traditional authority within the community were being 
erased. A spiritual devastation followed, as the homes for spirits and trees with 
significant historical resonance were being cut and shipped off. And so it is little 




The Force behind Industrial Extraction 
Industrial charcoal production and transport had a clear ethnic and political valence. 
The industrial charcoal trade was presented as being dominated by people from 
southern Uganda, who were an obvious presence among the charcoal dealers on the 
roads and trading centers of the north, as well as among the truck drivers and workers 
who burn the charcoal and load the trucks. But not only are the workers and 
transporters perceived to be from the south of Uganda; it also appears that the 
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industry is dominated by a handful of Kampala-based elites. From research in 
Kampala markets and in the North, it appears that significant vertical and horizontal 
integration characterizes the industry. A handful of big dealers, it is reported, own 
fleets of trucks, buy sections of forests, and bring in their own workers to produce the 
charcoal. They then sell the charcoal to retail outlets in Kampala for 65,000 to 70,000 
shillings, depending on the quality, which is then sold for 80,000 for a sack or sold in 
smaller quantities for a higher profit. This vertical and horizontal integration is 
ignored by the dominant academic and policy literature: the Ministry’s Biomass 
Energy Strategy, for instance, declares that the solution is to “attract investors with 
substantial cash outlay” and not “leave charcoal production 100% in the hands of 
unorganized capital strapped producers” (75) – ignoring the fact that this is exactly 
what has happened and has led to such destructive consequences. 
 
Another crucial aspect of industrial charcoal extraction, according to rural 
communities, local organizations, and local government officials, has been entirely 
unnoted by the academic and policy literature. This is the alleged involvement of the 
Ugandan state and military.  In interviews, it was almost always explained that the 
charcoal traders and transporters were not operating on their own. Rather, they were 
said to have state coercion on their side. Considering Uganda’s contemporary political 
economy, it is not a surprise to hear reports that the state and military are involved in 
the charcoal trade. The Ugandan state and military – a military–political–business 
elite – have long been deeply involved in business and extractive industries, often 
using force to acquire land or concessions, and have been condemned in the past for 
their involvement in the looting of natural resources in neighboring countries 
(Sjögren, 2013; Fisher and Anderson, 2015; Mwenda, 2007). Militarized, forceful 
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displacements of communities by the state, whether for minerals, game reserves, 
parks, infrastructure, agri-business, or personal accumulation, are often enforced 
through military violence (Martiniello, 2015a; Carmody and Taylor, 2016; Lyons, Nel 
and Westoby, 2017); indeed, many of the large commercial farms owned by state 
elites are reported to be guarded by the Ugandan military (Ocungi 2018). Charcoal, 
especially when regulation can be avoided, provides an opportunity for significant 
profit by controlling the trade from start to finish through significant vertical 
integration, as one person with capital and political connections can pay for access to 
land, bring in work crews, and transport the product to Kampala, all underpinned by 
free military force. Another dimension of the assertion of state authority occurs 
through the manipulation of property regimes and land institutions, which allows the 
state to enhance its control over land and territory. According to Boone (2014) land 
conflicts and shifting land tenure regimes in Africa, which she divides into 
‘neocustomary and state land’ (65-67), do not only result from the increasing intensity 
of commoditization, but also result from the making of particular property institutions 
which are intertwined with issues of political authority, citizenship, political identity 
and ethnicity. 
 
Military and state involvement in charcoal extraction has led to a very direct 
connection between its violence and an aspect of the violence of the civil war: those 
driving the tree cutting are often identified as the very people who had been at the 
forefront of the government counterinsurgency in Acholiland. Ugandan military 
officers, it is said, got to know the Acholi countryside during the war and returned 
afterwards to exploit its resources. There had been a small amount of logging of 
hardwoods while the war was going on, it appears, but looting escalated dramatically 
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in the post-war period, sometimes literally following the same routes as the 
counterinsurgency: many of the security roads that were cut by the Ugandan military 
during the war for their military vehicles to reach remote locales are now used to 
extract charcoal and timber. As one informant put it, “The people who bring their 
workers…to produce charcoal here are military commanders…the army commanders 
are Banyakole [President Museveni’s ethnic group]”. It was reported that transporters 
would be accompanied by military without uniforms and that traders and burning 
crews were sometimes armed. As one informant put it, “The government workers also 
give the rich people permission to cut the trees in that even if you complain, nothing 
will be done for you….Those people have security that we can’t stop.” After clear-
cutting, cattle also thought to belong to state or military elites and similarly guarded 
may be brought in to graze on the newly opened land. 
 
Many communities reported that local government was reaping significant profits 
from collaborating with charcoal dealers and thus had no interest in ending the trade, 
however destructive. Those tasked with trying to regulate it expressed helplessness: 
the district leadership blamed corrupt sub-county officials, and vice-versa; but many 
also cited the involvement of high-ranking political or military elites. This was 
discussed sometimes openly, but often in slightly more hushed tones. Some officials 
spoke confidentially about arresting illegal charcoal dealers and impounding their 
charcoal and then suddenly getting a call from military headquarters demanding that 
the person be released. Trucks impounded today and gone tomorrow; drivers or 
merchants arrested today and released tomorrow. Others talked openly of local 
leaders being in the pay of charcoal dealers (Omona, 2016). And some human rights 
activists reported having received threatening phone calls when they were seen as 
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interfering with charcoal dealers or traders. A rare public statement was made by the 
Local Council 5 Chairman of Amuru district, who, after imposing a ban on 
production, reported receiving threats: “I have names and recorded voices of the big 
persons in government and the army which I will expose if they continue” (Omony, 
2016). The result has been that the powerful, those connected with the state and 
backed up by its security services, are seen as operating with impunity in cutting 
down trees for charcoal and timber, their power underpinned by the constant threat 
and occasional deployment of force. 
 
More research would be needed in order to determine the full extent and nature of the 
state and military’s involvement; however, this research would be risky if not 
impossible and the gains to be obtained are uncertain. For what we know already is 
that, whether the state and military officials are the large traders themselves, are 
investors or business partners for traders, or are providing favors to politically-
connected businesspeople, the fact that military force seems to be involved both at the 
production and transport stages indicates that their integration into the industry is 
extensive. The end of the war thus did not mean the end of state violence in the north; 
instead, it appears to have taken on different forms. As one informant described it, the 
community was now experiencing “the war that has been waged against trees” as a 
continuation of a war against people that concluded a decade ago. That war had been 
largely experienced by Acholi civilians as the state, in collusion with international 
forces, destroying their conditions for life, livelihood, and community, in particular 
through its devastating policy of forced internment (Branch 2011). Today’s charcoal 
industry, as part of a wider regime of state-led extractivism, is experienced in the 
same way. And so charcoal production cannot be understood without placing it within 
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this legacy of the war: a militarized, unaccountable, extractive, state that seems 
willing to sacrifice the people of northern Uganda for its own gain and with impunity. 
 
 
Internal Politics of Charcoal Production 
The state force behind the charcoal industry helps to explain why industrial 
production has proceeded at such a rapid rate despite widespread community outrage 
and negative media attention. But access to land and trees has largely been acquired 
without major explicit violence against communities, which has been a feature of land 
and resource grabs by the state elsewhere in Uganda (Martiniello, 2015a).  To 
understand why industrial charcoal production has been able to proceed with the 
consent of some members of the community – in a context, of course, of the 
overarching threat of state violence – often through negotiating access to trees instead 
of simply seizing access, it is important to understand how charcoal extraction is also 
enabled by, and exacerbating, the major fractures within the community along inter-
community, class, gender, and generational lines. These fractures are also largely a 
legacy of the war. 
 
Most land in Acholi is held under customary communal tenure within a complex, 
changing system, with significant differences among different parts of the sub-region 
(Hopwood, 2015; Martiniello, 2015a). The war and displacement introduced new 
uncertainty into customary tenure: stories are often told about how elders who knew 
land boundaries and regulated land access have died or lost authority; trees, stones, or 
creeks that had demarcated different pieces of land have been lost. The years after the 
war have been a time of intense land wrangles between individuals, families, 
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communities, clans, and with the rich and powerful (Atkinson and Owor, 2015). 
These wrangles have been exacerbated by pressures for individualization, 
formalization, and titling of tenure, as well as by expansion of commercial farming 
(Martiniello, 2015b). Widespread perceptions prevail of a state campaign to grab land 
for politically-connected elites and international capital, and stories abound of local or 
national elites securing land at the expense of the poor and powerless. Such 
perceptions of land insecurity have been made more acute by the recent attempt of the 
Ugandan government to amend article 26 of the 1995 Constitution. Under current 
legislation, the state needs to provide fair and adequate compensation in case of 
takeover of private land earmarked for public projects. The proposed Land Bill would 
instead allow the state to forcefully confiscate land if it is deemed to be of national 
developmental importance while a legal adjudication proceeds. The system is one in 
which very cash-poor people, or people with little capacity for farming, can 
sometimes lay claim to large parcels of land, while elites can accumulate large 
portions through money or power. Existing regimes governing usufruct rights to trees 
also appear unprepared to deal with the extraction of trees on a commercial scale. And 
finally, it is a context in which the main source of savings for most Acholi before the 
war – cattle – are yet to be restored, and so people’s capacity for dealing with poor 
harvests or sudden expenses is extremely thin. 
 
In this context, people provide access to forested land or sell trees for different 
reasons and in different ways. That section of the cash-poor who are able to lay claim 
to customary land with trees – whether their own farming land or communal hunting 
or grazing land – may sell trees because of poverty and a lack of savings. Youth are 
often blamed as having been corrupted during the war and displacement by a “quick 
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money” mentality and driven by individual greed instead of community wellbeing. 
Responding to this reputation, one young man explained: “what are you going to do to 
stop these people from coming and offering us money for our trees? Because if they 
offer us the money, we are going to have to take it!” But people also recognized that 
those selling trees often reaped little benefit; as one informant put it, “they sell among 
the outsiders and all the money remains theirs” – again, replicating the north-south 
divide entrenched during the war. Some selling trees for subsistence described being 
stuck in a vicious cycle: the poorest rely the most upon forests, whether through 
medicinal herbs and plants, hunting, firewood, providing shade, rain, and windblocks. 
As the commons are lost and rainfall decreases, sustainable smallholder farming 
becomes even more difficult. Natural habitats and, by consequence, smallholders’ 
harvests are negatively affected by a combined and cumulative series of pressures, 
including insecure land access, irregular rainfall and floods, deteriorating soil fertility, 
wetlands encroachment, commercial cotton production, the presence of wild animals 
such as elephants, and distress caused by insects. Moreover, the shifting agricultural 
calendar has altered the pattern of inter- and mixed-cropping that had previously 
characterized agriculture in the sub-region and had allowed for efficiently combining 
sorghum, millet, simsim, pigeon peas, cassava and sweet potatoes. In such a context 
of expanding de-agrarianization of rural livelihoods and the absence of state policy 
supporting smallholders’ agriculture or family farming, “charcoal money is our 
compensation,” as one respondent put it. People rely on charcoal money even as it is 
perceived to worsen the conditions making them sell trees, as people are violently 
forced into the position of doing what they know will undermine their future survival 
in order to survive today. 
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Another reason given for cutting down or selling trees for charcoal was insecurity 
over land, in particular fear that government was going to take away “idle” land. This 
is also a product of the war, as the policy of forced internment was seen by many 
Acholi as a strategy by the state to vacate the land and take it over, and the idea that 
the state seeks to exterminate the Acholi or turn them into laborers on their own land 
remains prevalent. In some cases, rumors that the government was going to declare a 
forest reserve led people to cut down or sell trees to destroy the forest and prevent its 
being grabbed: “People are cutting trees because they have been told that 
[government] do not want people here because this is forest land …so people have 
decided that if it is like that we shall do away with the trees.” As another informant 
explained, “Here we don’t have enough information, there is a rumor that Amuru 
district wants to give away this area to a certain white investor. That is why people are 
selling trees with the hope that at least we would have gained [something] from the 
land.” 
 
These relatively poor tree-sellers might be distinguished from relatively well-off tree-
sellers, who may be rural elites, commercial farmers, or absentee landowners. These 
actors can take advantage of often unclear, in-flux, and unenforced customary land 
arrangements, sometimes using state violence. The connection between local elites 
and state power was intensified during the war, which saw a contingent of Acholi 
collaborators reap economic and political profit in the midst of general destruction. 
Tree sales are a new subject of intense contention, as they are cut from land that 
several communities or households lay claim to, from communal grazing or hunting 
lands over which there is disagreement over use rights. Stories abound of individuals 
living in town who suddenly sold off all the trees on “his” land and pocketed a hefty 
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sum. Cutting trees also removes disputed land out of the commons by insulating it 
from the multitude of claims that can arise from complex and contested customary 
tenure. In some cases, land owners were reported to be cutting down trees and then 
planting pine or eucalyptus monocultures – an activity reportedly enjoying extremely 
high rates of return on the order of 15-18%, according to the Uganda Investment 
Authority – either for timber or to be eventually burned in improved kilns in 
anticipation of a “green” charcoal market – an ironic aspect of “green development” 
(Byakagaba and Muhiirwe, 2017; Lyons and Nel, 2017). 
 
Tree-selling seems to have a strong gender dimension, given the tendency for men to 
have greater authority over land access and use. Again, gender conflicts have been a 
notable facet of the post-war context, during which men have sought to re-establish 
authority lost during the war through asserting their “traditional” control over land 
tenure (Branch, 2013; Hopwood, 2015). One woman explained that the only person 
making money from selling trees was “The landowner who sells the trees. You who 
have no husband, you don’t get anything.” And those without any claim to land can 
even be faced with expulsion: “People like us, who are squatting on people’s land, we 
have nothing to show, even the land owners now wants to chase us away from their 
land.” 
 
As noted, there is a significant debate in the charcoal literature over the drivers of 
deforestation, in particular how to weigh charcoal’s impact against agricultural 
expansion. There is little research done on this issue in Uganda (Khundi et al., 2011), 
although in western Uganda’s Albertine Rift, Twongyirwe (forthcoming) identified 
agricultural expansion – commercial and small-scale sugarcane plantations – as the 
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leading factor affecting the forested landscape of the region. Agricultural expansion 
seems a major driver in northern Uganda as well, where, in some instances, trees were 
clearly being cut as a result of the rapid expansion of commercial farming. However, 
there was also a common accusation that the claim to be cutting trees to open land 
was a ruse to cover for profitable tree-selling. The introduction of incentives for 
deforestation through commercial charcoal production appear to be changing 
decisions about whether to put more land under production, under tree plantations, or 
to rent it for commercial agriculture. This testifies to the complexity of the relations 
among different factors producing deforestation (Bergmann et al 2018; Iiyama et al, 
2017). 
 
From interviews and anecdotal evidence, therefore, while small-scale, household 
production was apparently supplementing incomes, industrial charcoal production 
seems to be producing greater inequality within the community, as those with the 
power to sell many trees profit, while those who had benefited from forests suffer. 
This is exacerbating many of the social and economic consequences of the war. 
Ecological devastation, increasing inequality, desperation for the future – these are the 
results of the violence of charcoal. They are linked closely with the legacy of the war: 
a militarized state with a history of violence against the civilian population; 
uncertainty and fear over security of land access combined with increasing insecurity 
over weather; easily exploitable divisions within society and the presence of land-
hungry politically connected elites and cash-poor rural elites – all this provided a 
fertile ground for the mass extraction of trees. Charcoal production is one aspect of 
the broader regime of state-driven, militarized extractivism that has taken shape in 
northern Uganda since the end of the war. Some people see themselves as being 
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sacrificed for the financial interests of the state, whether through extracting value 
through oil, scarce minerals, sugar cane, sand and rocks, infrastructure, eco-tourism, 
conservations schemes, sugarcane, GMO seeds, soybeans, water, refugees, cloned 
eucalyptus, or, of course, indigenous trees. This resonates with the context described 
by Barney (2015), as charcoal is one of a series of natural resources that is over-
exploited in succession, “ushering the countryside into a reinforcing spiral of 
environmental degradation and underdevelopment” (205). 
 
In this context, some solutions to deforestation proposed by rural communities reflect 
that violent political reality. Desperation at state impunity led a woman in a hard-hit 
area to announce at a local government meeting that they should “just kill” all the 
southerners burning charcoal. In one case, a community attacked a camp of workers 
and killed one and injured over 30 others (Otim, 2016). Enforcement missions by 
district leadership resort to arresting and beating charcoal dealers or transporters, 
since no other form of punishment or regulation may seem possible (Odokonyero, 
2017; Omony 2016). And a woman who said she had been a rebel herself said that the 
solution was for the community to be given guns – “we know how to use them, we 
can solve this ourselves.”  
 
 
Fantasies of Charcoal Futures 
The violence of charcoal extraction, the legacy of the war in shaping it, and the reality 
of large-scale industrial production and its destructiveness – all these tend to be 
ignored in the academic and policy literatures. Instead, small-scale livelihood 
production is taken to be the norm, and so the ecological and social devastation of 
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industrial production is blamed on community members involved in livelihood 
production. Some invoking this storyline tend to sympathize with the producers, 
recognizing the poverty that has placed them in such desperate straits and calling for 
the provision of alternative livelihoods; others, especially urban local elites and 
government, condemn rural producers as greedy, short-sighted, and ignorant, in need 
of punishment and sensitization (Ojara, 2015). But both fail to distinguish between 
small-scale household production and large-scale industrial extraction and their very 
different politics, and both make poor rural people responsible for causing and solving 
what those rural people themselves know to be caused by much larger political and 
economic structures. 
 
Unable to face the political reality of the charcoal industry, solutions proposed by 
NGOs and development agencies tend to focus on “improving the value chain.” A 
recent UNDP report explains the solution is a “holistic one” to ensure poverty 
alleviation, a regular energy supply, local environmental sustainability and 
contribution to climate change mitigation. This includes the introduction of improved 
kilns and cooking stoves, along with “the creation and institutionalization of a 
charcoal unit at the district level that is charged with purchasing from producers, 
categorizing the type produced so producers can be paid a differentiated value based 
on whether or not the product is sustainable, and arranging transport from the districts 
to Government-created warehouses located outside urban areas. At the warehouses, 
the charcoal will be sold by retail associations.” (UNDP, 2013: 9). These win-win 
narratives are, at present, a world of fantasy. Indeed, Uganda has long been 
characterized by a gulf separating the good governance, neoliberal development, 
climate change adaptation, and human rights that exist in the reports and plans of 
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Uganda’s international donors, from the reality of a militarized state reliant on 
Western donor money and coercive extraction presiding over precarious rural and 
urban populations. 
 
This state shapes charcoal as an energy source, just as charcoal provides much of the 
power that fuels this state by making Uganda’s rapid urbanization possible, without 
which rural crises could take on even more dramatic form. Cheap and accessible 
charcoal helps buy the acquiescence of the urban population, where political 
opposition is concentrated and where the threat of urban uprisings remains significant 
(Branch and Mampilly, 2015). There are reports that charcoal is the key fuel for 
industry, especially steel mills; if this is true, then the Ugandan government’s alliance 
with the country’s small industrial sector may also be dependent upon cheap charcoal. 
And ensuring a plentiful charcoal supply takes pressure away from the development 
of other sources of energy, whether gas or electricity, allowing those industries to be a 
source of rents for the state or politically connected elites.  
 
But, as Mitchell argues, today’s forms of energy entail certain political limits that are 
entangled with ecological limits. In the case of charcoal in northern Uganda, its 
particular mode of extraction and production, with its attendant ecological 
destruction, has been made possible because of political violence and the legacies of 
the war. And so, as long as the politics of the industry remain as they are, the rapid 
extension of the charcoal frontier, leaving deforested and degraded landscapes in its 
wake, is unlikely to end soon. Further exacerbating this tendency is that the 
destruction of the commons is a precondition for visions of extractivist development, 
from which the state and domestic and international capital derive significant profit. 
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However, as the charcoal extraction frontier reaches the South Sudan border, it is not 
clear where else it can go within Uganda, and so new, violent, regional fuelscapes 
may soon be emerging. The rapid expansion of tree-planting for charcoal, more 
sustainable wood cutting practices, introduction of improved kilns and stoves, 
development of alternative biofuels: these might help make Uganda’s own forest 
stocks last longer within the industry’s current configuration. But without attention to 
the role that state power and the history of the war are playing in today’s charcoal 
production and trade, these regulatory and technological fixes may well be 
inadequate. The destructiveness of charcoal will prove far more intractable than 
expected, and these de-politicized, technical, solutions may only hide and entrench 
deeper problems of political inequality and violence. The result may be that more 
forceful and organized resistance may arise among those losing their commons so that 
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1 As Mwampamba et al (2013) point out, these data cannot necessarily be taken as 
entirely representative, due to a significant data scarcity largely resulting from the 
clandestine nature of production, poor regulation and informality. They also point out 
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the sometimes huge discrepancies between IEA and FAO data. The unreliability 
derives also from an underlying politics of numbers, in which states, donors, and 
other development agencies act as gate-keepers in the production of knowledge about 
development, including its indicators, measures, and representations (Jerven 2013). 
2 There is a wider literature on the relation between political violence, peacebuilding, 
and energy, in particular around oil in Nigeria and South Sudan (Ohunakin et al 2014; 
Mozersky and Kammen, 2018). However, these are generally dealt with within the 
resources literature, without particular attention to their being sources of energy, as 
Mitchell (2011) seeks to do. The most attention to charcoal integrated into conflict is 
currently in Somalia, with some attention to Virunga in DRC (Cavanagh et al., 2015; 
UNEP Interpol, 2014). 
3 This article is written by two members of the research team, which included XXX. 
In total, twenty-five discussions were held. The discussions were held in the Acholi 
language and then transcribed and translated into English. A dozen individual 
interviews were conducted, all in English. Research ethics clearance was approved by 
the Makerere University College of Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics 
Committee, and permission was granted by the Ugandan National Council of Science 
and Technology. Funding was provided by XXX. 
4 There is a need for research to determine the actual breakdown between these 
different forms of production in northern Uganda, which we hope future projects can 
help determine. Right now, our argument is based upon qualitative data and 
perceptions of community members, local officials, civil society, and others. 
5 Research is expanding into Uganda’s national energy politics, sparked by the recent 
dam-building and infrastructure projects, the rapid incursion of solar, and of course 
the development of oil resources (see Trotter, 2016; Gore, 2017). 
